While the US and NATO and the Afghan security officials are willing to underline the latter’s ascending capacities, such views have been viewed with considerable skepticism among civil society and women groups, NGO’s and people in Afghanistan . The impressive performance of the ANSF during some of the high-profile and well coordinated insurgent attacks has been cited as evidence of its growing strength and capabilities. Analysts insist that they have come of age and no longer the ‘rag tag’ men in uniform they used to be.

At the same time, concerns still exist on the ANSF capability to gather adequate intelligence on the planning and execution of well-coordinated multiple sieges, an insurgent tactic that has gained predominance. Example is cited of the multicity Taliban attack on 15 April 2012, when Taliban suicide attackers carried out attack on Kabul, and three other eastern provinces – Nangarhar, Logar and Paktia. The fact that the insurgents could slip into the protected capital evading several security check points with a huge stockpile of weapons and penetrate the most secure inner circle of Kabul’s ring of steel is a matter of deep worry. NATO commended the ANSF for effectively defending the city and ultimately quelling the attack. But observers are quick to point out that the operation appeared impossible to conclude without the back-up support from NATO helicopters and Special Forces.

NATO’s praise for the ANSF is understandable, for it is on such success that the exit strategy is predicated. The ANA has been primarily employed to augment the international forces’ COIN campaign. In 2011, over 90 per cent of ISAF operations were conducted in conjunction with the ANA, an increase from 62 per cent of such operations in spring and summer of 2008. However, this projected conjunction could actually be a misnomer. According to a recent US Department of Defense report in 2012, only 13 out of the 156 Afghan Army battalions are classified as ‘independent with advisers’ and only 74 are seen as ‘effective with advisers’. In effect, there is very little to indicate that the ANA will be able to act autonomously over large swathes of the countryside in the next two or three years. Especially remote in the coming years is the possibility of transferring responsibility for the protection of the provinces bordering Pakistan to the Afghan army. Alongside the questions of capacities, maintaining a huge security force establishment is a financial impossibility for the resource-starved Afghan government.

The total strength of the ANSF in October 2011 reached 306,903 (170,781 soldiers and 136,122 policemen). Future plans envisage an increase to 352,000 personnel (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) by October 2012. Final ANSF end-strength post-2014, however, remains to be determined by prevailing security, political and financial conditions. The government in Kabul is bound to face the most formidable challenge of mentoring the forces and finding continuous funding for such a huge project.. These numbers would be highly unsustainable for an external aid dependent state whose core annual budget is barely US$2.685 billion for the 2012-13 financial year. It was after much deliberation, the US and its allies at the Chicago summit, envisaged a force of 228,500 with an estimated annual budget of $4.1 billion. This amounts to what the U.S. currently spends every 12 days in Afghanistan The greater worry, however, lies in the scenario of acceleration of training impinging on the quality of the forces. Analysts suggest that the ANSF is already ‘unmanageable’ and hence, the term ‘expansion’ is nothing but a paradox.

While observers perceive some success in terms of raising a capable and independent ANA, serious concerns have been expressed about the capabilities of the ANP and the convoluted attempts in establishing rule of law. Analysts point out that while the ANA is seen as a relative success vis-a-vis the ANP, the chronic deficiencies and problems of funding, equipment, training, desertion, ethnic balancing and infiltration cannot be overlooked. There are serious concerns of creating a ‘hyper-militarized’ state. The feasibility of building a large army without addressing larger issues of civil-military relations has been questioned, particularly when the government in Kabul is perceived to be weak. The lingering concerns of ethnic balancing and representation combined with the challenges of building a national army on meritocratic lines remain.

Despite major efforts by the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) in recent years, the development of the institutional capacity of the ANSF will take years. The ANSF’s quality, its professional and institutional capability and its capacity to function in an unstable and conflict-ridden environment are bound to be tested in the coming years. The rising incidence of ‘green on blue attacks’, i.e. rogue soldiers and police turning their weapons on their ISAF mentors, remains a serious concern. In 2011, 35 NATO soldiers and trainers were killed in 21 incidents of such ‘green on blue’ attacks by the Afghan soldiers. In the first half of 2012, there have been 32 such incidents, killing 40. The Taliban are quick to claim credit for such attacks, claiming infiltration of its cadres into the ANSF ranks. NATO commanders, on the other hand, argue that many such attacks are driven by personal grudges rather than loyalty to the Taliban or other groups.

In addition to problems associated with inadequate vetting mechanisms and background checks due to the rush to recruit, the increased number of attacks has led to a ‘trust deficit’ between the Afghan soldiers and their mentors leading to scaling down of the NATO’s training and mentoring assistance. While the ANA is construed to be relatively successful, the Afghan National Police (ANP) is bedeviled with problems. The ANP is expected to perform law enforcement, border protection and counter-narcotics functions. However, the ANP is not only perceived to be ineffective, corrupt and illdisciplined, it faces the problems of funding, training, recruitment, equipment, infiltrations and desertions. ANP’s development has been hindered by lack of institutional reform, widespread corruption, insufficient international military trainers and advisors. As a result, ANP has minimal control over the urban centers, with almost no presence in Afghan villages where they are most needed.

To address the inadequacies of the ANP, a stop-gap measure of recruiting tribal militias under the Afghan Local Police (ALP) has been initiated. In a spate of anti-Taliban uprisings, on the lines of the Anwar Awakening in Iraq, these forces have been successful in repelling the harsh Taliban edicts, school closings in Ghazni, music bans in Nuristan, beheadings in Paktia and murders in Laghman, among other causes. However, concerns remain of such independent and ‘well-stocked armoriesmilitias and they typically behave like the Taliban with a different name’. The project of replicating the Iraq model runs imminent danger of a contravention of the efforts of long-term institution-building and reforms in the security sector. These persisting weaknesses and ‘quick fixes’ are bound to affect the ANSF performance in the long term. Political Sector, Constitutional and Electoral Reform While most of the debate on transition has veered towards security sector, meaningful discussion on the transition in the political sector, particularly when the year of handover of responsibility coincides with the 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan, seems to be missing. Analysts posit that ‘placing sole responsibility for Afghanistan’s future stability on the ANSF without making progress in creating a stronger political consensus among Afghanistan’s diverse factions, both armed and unarmed, is a highrisk gamble’.

Over the past decade, the highly centralized executive form of political system has been constantly challenged, both by the insurgent campaign to discredit the present political system and also by the challenges from within the system. The constant bickering between the President and Parliament, deteriorating security, poor governance and the near-absence of rule of law have sparked debates inside and outside Afghanistan for the need for wide-ranging political sector reforms. The magnitude of the problem and simmering discontent has led observers to forewarn: ‘If in 2001 the West was afraid that the absence of a strong centralized government in Kabul would prompt Afghanistan’s dissolution, by 2011 the West has come to fear that a dysfunctional centralized government could cause this same outcome.’ In addition to the existing challenges in the political sector, the complexity of holding elections in the year of handover of authority is daunting. Analysts point out: ‘The Afghan presidential election slated for 2014 is an uninspiring prospect given the skyhigh levels of corruption, nepotism, and patronage that beleaguers the Afghan political system.

To make things worse, President Hamid Karzai has suggested holding the elections in 2013 to avoid an overlap with the planned end of NATO’s combat mission. And there is still no functional plan in place for a smooth transfer of political power to a post-Karzai government.’ In the absence of large scale political sector and electoral reform, the danger of repeat of previous instances of electoral malpractices at a crucial time of transition is cause for widespread concern. The challenges associated with institutionbuilding in the political sector stem from inadequate steps taken by the international community to help build a robust political system based on a sound understanding of the nature of the Afghan state and the political processes, which shape the local preferences.

Abstract

A decade after the military intervention that dislodged the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine, peace and stability continues to elude Afghanistan. There is still no consensus in Western capitals on what constitutes the ‘end-state’ in Afghanistan. The Western public’s frustration with a long-drawn war has coalesced with the global economic slowdown, the Euro crisis and the pressures of electoral campaign politics in the United States – thereby complicating the efforts for the long-term stabilization of Afghanistan. Premature announcements of exit and dwindling financial assistance have added to the Afghan anxieties of being ‘abandoned’ once again. This paper brings to light the divergent perceptions among the key stakeholders in Afghanistan and in the international community (IC) on the trajectory of the ‘inteqal’ (transition) process. The paper argues that the war in Afghanistan is essentially a war of perceptions on progress made thus far. This widening gap in perceptions is bound to complicate the transition and long term stabilization process.

To be continued next week