Negotiators are falling back on ‘Plan B’, which banks on emphasizing India’s achievements during its presidency

“While no G20 member is likely to challenge India’s version of a successful summit, the western press would take a rather different view. Its main interest will be the Ukraine war and the statements of western leaders on that war. They will also observe the approach taken by China — if President Xi Jinping participates in the summit, what he would say on Ukraine, and on his possible interaction with US President Joe Biden and other western leaders. It will also focus on the summit’s approaches to the concerns of developed economies. Naturally, if Russian President Vladimir Putin attends the summit, all attention will be on his presence and the reaction it evokes among his western peers. Thus, the yardstick by which the West will judge the summit will be radically different from the way India may like.”

The G20 summit is scheduled to be held in Delhi in a little more than six weeks. There is no doubt that India has the capability to ensure flawless and successful logistics for the summit. The government has also held numerous meetings in different parts of the country on various subjects and themes covered by the G20. It adopted this novel and unprecedented approach to ensure that most parts of the country get a sense of participation in India’s presidency of the group, even though it is only rotational in nature.

The G20 summit is one of the most important multilateral events ever hosted by India. This is because this group of 20 —19 countries and the European Union — “represents around 85 per cent of the global GDP, over 75 per cent of the global trade and about two-thirds of the world population”, as India’s website on the summit notes. Modi would naturally be keen to do everything possible to have a memorable summit. The question, though, is what will actually constitute a successful summit.

While such a question is germane to every multilateral summit, it becomes essential to ask it regarding the G20 summit because of the deep global divisions generated by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. There will inevitably be special attention on India, as the host country, for generally it is the host’s responsibility to find a way through the contentions to forge a consensus outcome document. If India is unable to do so, will this detract from the success of the summit?

This question is also relevant because all previous G20 summits resulted in consensus documents. A Bali Declaration emerged from the last summit held in Indonesia in November 2022, following which India took over the group’s leadership. The declaration contained a paragraph dealing with the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It was carefully crafted. It referred to the statements already made by G20 members at the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. It noted that the UNGA deplored Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It also mentioned that most G20 members ‘condemned’ the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Thus, the paragraph was, all in all, critical of Russia.

In all meetings at ministerial and other levels held under India’s presidency on different subjects, Russia and China have refused to endorse the Bali Declaration paragraph on Ukraine. To deal with their objections, India adopted a policy to issue ‘Outcome Document and Chair’s Summary’ for each of these meetings. While the ‘Outcome Document’ portion of the meetings’ reports relate to the agreements reached on the subjects under consideration in these meetings, the ‘Chair’s Summary’ is on the Ukraine conflict.

The ‘Chair’s Summary’ repeats the Bali Declaration paragraph on Ukraine with a footnote that Russia and China did not agree with it. This stratagem has worked because India has the cover provided by the Bali Declaration but that will not be available for the Delhi summit declaration. A subsequent summit is naturally not bound by the formulations of previous summits. Till now, the negotiations led by Indian officials have not closed the gap on this difficult issue. If India adopts the ‘Chair’s Summary’ route at the Delhi summit, it has to ensure that its formulation is largely acceptable to all members. It cannot fly solo; it entails the risk of crashing and can lead to charges that the summit has failed.

Indian negotiators are aware of the problems that the Ukraine issue will create, though they will try their best to find a language that is acceptable to all members. This process, howsoever difficult, cannot be ignored and will have to be undertaken at the next Sherpas’ meeting. Meanwhile, Indian negotiators are falling back on what can only be considered as ‘Plan B’. This banks on emphasizing India’s achievements during its presidency, especially giving primacy and voice to issues concerning the welfare of the Global South. It also involves making developed countries pay attention to the pressing problems relating to the debt burden of the Global South. In addition, India is keen to show how digital power can be harnessed for speedy development. The crowning part of ‘Plan B’ is India’s advocacy for the African Union becoming a member of the G20. There is a good chance that it will succeed in this endeavor.

Thus, even if no consensus is reached on the Ukraine crisis, India will emphasize that its G20 presidency and the summit have been successful because it has emerged as the leading advocate of the Global South. This will be attributed to Modi’s international stature and the great position India has come to acquire globally under his nine-year stewardship of the country.

While no G20 member is likely to challenge India’s version of a successful summit, the western press would take a rather different view. Its main interest will be the Ukraine war and the statements of western leaders on that war. They will also observe the approach taken by China — if President Xi Jinping participates in the summit, what he would say on Ukraine, and on his possible interaction with US President Joe Biden and other western leaders. It will also focus on the summit’s approaches to the concerns of developed economies. Naturally, if Russian President Vladimir Putin attends the summit, all attention will be on his presence and the reaction it evokes among his western peers. Thus, the yardstick by which the West will judge the summit will be radically different from the way India may like.

Back in 1983, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in India was overshadowed by the Iran–Iraq war. No consensus was reached on the paragraph on the war and a Chair statement was attached to the political declaration. But that Chair statement was acceptable to all and under Indira Gandhi’s stewardship, the summit was an acknowledged success. But those were different times for Indian diplomacy.
(The author is a Former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India)