CONTD FROM PREVIOUS ISSUE
Abstract A decade after the military intervention that dislodged the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine, peace and stability continues to elude Afghanistan. There is still no consensus in Western capitals on what constitutes the ‘end-state’ in Afghanistan. The Western public’s frustration with a long-drawn war has coalesced with the global economic slowdown, the Euro crisis and the pressures of electoral campaign politics in the United States – thereby complicating the efforts for the long-term stabilization of Afghanistan.Premature announcements of exit and dwindling financial assistance have added to the Afghan anxieties of being ‘abandoned’ once again. This paper brings to light the divergent perceptions among the key stakeholders in Afghanistan and in the international community (IC) on the trajectory of the ‘inteqal’ (transition) process. The paper argues that the war in Afghanistan is essentially a war of perceptions on progress made thus far. This widening gap in perceptions is bound to complicate the transition and long term stabilization process.

According to Fawzia Koofi, a potential presidential contender and Member of Parliament (MP) from Badkshan, the main issue facing post-conflict societies is the construction of a politically stable and democratic state that has both the institutions and legitimacy to remain viable in the long run.

Afghan observers point out that the first and second Bonn conferences did not address the need for political reform. The 2004 Constitution, which is sourced mostly from the 1964 Constitution when Afghanistan was a monarchy, has established one of the most highly centralized governments in the world.

A gradual political reform towards a less centralized government is a necessary step. Amending the 2004 Constitution to establish different forms of government based on decentralization, while preserving the unity of Afghanistan, remains the only viable option. This would help build consensus among Afghans and lay the foundations of durable peace as the international military foot print recedes in 2014.

If Afghanistan is to achieve some degree of stability after 2014, a concerted effort must be exerted towards political reform through checks and balances. Two rounds of elections in Afghanistan have identified the ineffectiveness of the current electoral system. The Afghan Constitution has shown limitations in providing answers to disputes arising from power relations of three branches of the government and jurisdictions of institutions over governing elections.

Despite a decade-long international commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan, not much has been done for institution-building, improving governance and establishing the rule of law. The nascent democratic government led by President Karzai is perceived as weak, corrupt and ineffective by the international community and the local population. The fraud-marred parliamentary elections of September 2011 further strengthened this perception.

Moreover, the reliance on local power brokers and warlords in the security operations and aid-delivery has undermined the development of effective state institutions and the rule of law. Consequently, the government now lacks credible institutional and political muscle to offset the influence of local power brokers and their deeply entrenched patronage systems.

This has resulted in corruption that permeates and impedes not only governance but also the political and economic sectors and has become a major obstacle in achieving security and development. Problems in the political sector have been exacerbated by a corresponding governance deficit. The near absence of an effective and independent Afghan civil service is another area of concern The Afghan government runs almost entirely on ‘contract employment’ and most of the better-qualified government employees are getting their pay from donor-financed project.

This effectively means that when the donors leave with their funds, most of these government officials would also leave with them, leaving the country with an even poorer prospect of establishing service-delivery mechanisms. The lack of effective governance, anticorruption measures and the absence of more inclusive politics would impede effective transition. Despite repeated attempts, the international community has been unable to convince President Karzai to permit political parties to assume a more direct role in the election process.

This combined with a peculiar voting system of Single Non Transferable Vote (SNTV) has contributed to the country’s fragmented politics and often immobilized legislative process. Analysts forewarn that the international community’s leverage with Afghan government in pressing for political sector reforms would decline as its presence in the country reduces.

The presidential elections are scheduled to be held in 2014, coinciding with the pullout of international troops. In the absence of large scale political sector and electoral reform, the danger of repeat of previous instances of electoral malpractices at a crucial time of transition remains a cause for widespread concern. The Afghan Constitution does not allow President Karzai to run for a third term.

A smooth transition of power to a new elected president and an expansion of the political basis of the government will have a positive impact on the stabilization of the country. On the contrary, any attempts by the present-day government to delay the elections as part of a power-sharing deal with the Taliban or to introduce measures such as convening a ‘Loya Jirga’ to rubber stamp an unconstitutional move to stay in power or appoint a ‘successor’, or resort to a la Putin technique could see the country slide back into renewed civil strife.

Peace Talks, Reconciliation and Reintegration
The ambiguity of the peace processes, reconciliation, reintegration, talks and negotiations with the insurgents has complicated the search for the ‘political solution’ to end the long war in Afghanistan. As individual countries are involved in unilateral and parallel efforts of negotiations, setting up office and contacts outside Afghanistan, this has further reinforced the notion that the West is willing to cut a deal with the insurgents and leave.

Such secretive and uncoordinated attempts have also raised concerns among the women and human rights groups and ethnic minorities. According to a survey conducted by Asia Foundation, ‘most Afghans want their girls educated, they want women to be able to go to the marketplace freely, they want them to be in public freely, they don’t agree with what the Taliban had done in the 1990s’. However, in the present discourse on transition, not just the gender narrative has taken a back seat, there are impending fears that the achievements made in the last decade with regard to women’s rights could be lost.

The indigenous peace-building efforts like the High Peace Council (HPC) and the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) appear to be casualty in the process, of both the insurgent onslaught and the international community’s strategy of omission. Even with the long-standing focus on negotiation with the high-ranking Taliban leaders, it is unclear if the international community has moved beyond a phase of opportunistic negotiation, i.e. negotiating with whosoever is available and willing rather than with insurgents of consequence and insurgents enjoying the sanction of top leaders in the insurgent hierarchy.

It is still not clear whether the process involves the Taliban leadership based in Quetta ( Quetta Shura Taliban). Or, is it simply trying to rope in people who have grown irrelevant to the insurgent movement, sometimes even getting duped by impostors who pose as interlocutors or representatives of the Taliban. While the lack of credible information on the identity of the interlocutors is a lesser problem, , several critical hurdles remain for the parties involved to make any significant headway.

The most important is the demand of the US that it would retain bases within Afghanistan beyond 2014. President Karzai has down played the talk of permanent presence of US troops, stating that it would be an impediment for negotiations with the Taliban who demanded complete withdrawal of foreign forces as a precondition for talks. Some moves were made to release imprisoned Taliban commanders from the detention centre at Guantanamo Bay, the failure to do so prompted the Taliban to suspend the peace talks in March 2012.

Efforts, however, continued to keep the fledgling negotiation process going, both by the US and its allies. Lack of a Pakistani endorsement, rooted in the country’s fear of being sidelined from the end-game in Afghanistan, has also played spoiler. In 2009, the negotiation prospect with the Taliban made some progress through a Taliban commander Mullah Baradar, second in command to Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban. However, Pakistani establishment stepped in and arrested Baradar in early 2010, derailing the entire process.

The same process resumed in 2012. Some other sources identified Tayyeb Agha, head of the political committee of the Taliban as another key interlocutor for the back channel talks. Tayyeb, too, was rumored to have been arrested by Pakistan in 2010 along with some other Taliban leaders. The control of the Pakistani military and intelligence on the ‘strategic assets’, the Taliban leadership, would make any meaningful Afghan-led reconciliation process an arduous task.

The US desire to talk to the insurgents from a position of strength continues to be a pipe dream.With the beginning of drawdown of international forces, the Taliban perceive themselves to be winning. In addition, by launching a successful campaign of violent retribution and targeted assassinations, the Taliban managed to create a power vacuum of sorts in southern Afghanistan. Three major assassinations in 2011 – Ahmed Wali Karzai, half brother of President Karzai, and presidential aide Jan Mohammed Khan, both powerful warlords and the Mayor of Kandahar, Ghulam Haider Hamidi – created a power vacuum in the south with consequent erosion of President Karzai’s support base among the Pushtuns.

As the contours of the negotiations remain unclear, the high-profile killings in the north and systematic elimination by the insurgents of those who oppose the negotiations process have raised fears among other ethnic and women groups. It has also led to polarization of among other ethnic groups with whispers of civil war gaining momentum. The talk of the early withdrawal of international forces and the ongoing negotiations with the Taliban have not only raised the levels of anxiety but have also been exploited by various actors as they position and jockey for power and influence in post-2014 Afghanistan.