CONTD FROM PREVIOUS ISSUEAbstract
A decade after the military intervention that dislodged the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine, peace and stability continues to elude Afghanistan. There is still no consensus in Western capitals on what constitutes the ‘end-state’ in Afghanistan. The Western public’s frustration with a long-drawn war has coalesced with the global economic slowdown, the Euro crisis and the pressures of electoral campaign politics in the United States – thereby complicating the efforts for the long-term stabilization of Afghanistan. Premature announcements of exit and dwindling financial assistance have added to the Afghan anxieties of being ‘abandoned’ once again. This paper brings to light the divergent perceptions among the key stakeholders in Afghanistan and in the international community (IC) on the trajectory of the ‘inteqal’ (transition) process. The paper argues that the war in Afghanistan is essentially a war of perceptions on progress made thus far. This widening gap in perceptions is bound to complicate the transition and long term stabilization process.

The negotiations with the Taliban constitute one such source of anxiety. As Americans claim that they have established contacts with the insurgents for peace talks in Qatar, various segments of the insurgency and power brokers are aiming to outbid each other in order to secure a larger portion of the pie. Not surprisingly, most of the violence has taken place in areas dominated by the Hizbe- Islami. Its leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, is eyeing a major share of the peace deal. Aid, Economic Development and Regional Cooperation Most of the discourse on transition has focused on the numerical strength of the troops that would be adequate to maintain the country’s security.

Civilian capacity building, economic opportunities, trade, transit and investment that would change the narrative of Afghanistan from being an aid-dependent ‘rentier state’ to a selfsustaining economy, thereby bringing in long-term stability, have received comparatively less attention. The intrinsic nature of aid-giving and execution of development projects through contracts and sub-contracting, has done little to build on state capacities or local ownership.

Afghanistan’s problem essentially lies in the lack of ‘unity of effort’ (UoE) on the part of the international community in developing a well-coordinated and longterm strategy to build and strengthen the institutions and ‘bring the state back’ into the development process. In rebuilding conflict-ridden states like Afghanistan, aiddelivery through ‘alternate delivery mechanisms’ like the IOs and INGOs or direct delivery through embassies, and community-based groups plays a crucial role in providing immediate humanitarian relief and assistance but in the long term have not been helpful in building state institutions of delivery and implementation. At a time of dwindling international financial assistance to Afghanistan, concerns abound on sustaining its economy and revenue beyond 2014.

Contrary to the Afghan government’s November 2011 estimate, it requires US$120 billion (at the rate of US$10 billion per year) in aid in the post-2014 period, through 2025. At the Tokyo summit in July 2012, international community promised to give US$16 billion through 2015 to build its economy and make necessary reforms. Such dwindling financial aid is construed as a natural corollary of the declining interest of the West in Afghanistan. Development aid from US, the largest aid donor, has dropped from US$3.5 billion in 2010 to about US$2 billion in 2011. Aid to support democracy, governance and civil society dropped by more than 50 per cent and from US$231 million to US$93 million in the same period. Amidst such a drop in aid-giving, exploring avenues for revenue generation, trade, foreign investment and development of indigenous economic base remains critical.

Over the coming years, Afghanistan will have to compensate for such shrinkage of external support. The full impact of the shrinkage on Afghanistan’s economic growth, fiscal sustainability and service delivery will probably not be felt until after 2014. The huge international spending in Afghanistan over the past decade has dramatically raised domestic prices (particularly of skilled workers and residential/commercial properties) that the country is no longer export-competitive vis-a-vis other South Asian countries. At least in this respect, the gradual scaling down of foreign spending might help lower prices closer to ‘South Asian levels’, which may help Afghanistan in increasing its exports although ‘transit’ issues will still remain a challenge. The transition process also assumes that Afghanistan will remain an aid-dependent state, in need of assistance to its economy and development for at least another decade.

While the second Bonn conference on ‘Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade’ held in December 2011 has set an extended period of international assistance: 2014-24 and has termed it the ‘transformational decade’, the contours of international assistance and engagement remain highly unclear.

A series of international conferences seems to miss the crucial point that stabilizing Afghanistan by devising quick-fix solutions and setting arbitrary timelines that do not meet the needs on the ground. A successful transition is contingent on the continued, albeit slow, growth in the administrative capacity of government ministries, and on improvements in local governance, civil service, development and employment opportunities at the district level. Afghanistan’s tragedy lies in the fact that time and again its internal contradictions have got trapped in the external power agenda. With the intensification of the search for the ‘end-game’, a regional consensus by forging greater cooperation is seen as a way out of the imbroglio. One way of building a cooperative regional architecture is through greater trade and transit, investment opportunities, including energy pipelines.

The Istanbul Conference for Afghanistan: Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia, held on 2 November 2011, provided a new agenda for regional cooperation, by placing Afghanistan at its centre and engaging the ‘Heart of Asia’ countries in sincere and result-oriented cooperation for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, as well as a secure and prosperous region as a whole. The emphasis for the first time on a regionally owned process led by Afghanistan, with support and collaboration from its near and extended neighbors, would make this effort ‘sustainable and irreversible’ in the long term.[50] As the first follow-up ministerial meeting of the Istanbul Process, the ‘Heart of Asia’ Ministerial Conference, convened on 14 June 2012 in Kabul, re-affirmed the commitments enshrined in the 2002 Kabul Declaration of Good Neighborly Relations and in the document on principles stipulated in the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan.

The narrative has thus been gradually shifting to regional confidence-building, development, governance, and most lately, trade, transit and investment, aiming to use the country’s resource- and transitpotential to build its economic viability, sustainability and self- reliance. To a large extent, the genesis of this thinking is based on the inadequacies of the securitydominated approach of the last decade. The discovery of huge reserves of minerals and natural gas has raised hopes of possibility of revenue generation, foreign investment and employment opportunities. To what extent these strategies can overcome the need to bring in security remains to be seen.

The Afghanistan International Investment Conference of 30 November 2010 held in Dubai and the Brussels Euro Mines Conference of 26 October 2011, aimed at promoting economic investment in Afghanistan, made valuable recommendations, but they essentially put the onus for investment on actions to be initiated by Afghanistan. The 28 June 2012 Delhi Summit, taking into consideration the realities and needs on the ground, explored near-term and long-term possibilities in the current environment and at the same time, sought a mechanism to address the needs of foreign and private sector investors and the government of Afghanistan. This is reflective in the efforts geared to catalyze investment decisions and forge cross-country and international partnerships to promote cooperation and greater collective confidence.

A collective view of security for foreign investors would emerge from the reality of venturing together, rather than individual investors risking an uncertain environment all by themselves. The long term economic benefits, revenue and employment opportunities arising out of investment, trade and transit would help build ‘constituencies of peace’. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan- India (TAPI) pipeline is another regional collaborative venture that has enormous potential of bringing in economic dividends through mutually beneficial regional cooperation.

By forging a greater stake and regional commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan through alternate economic opportunities, , foreign investment and local development strategies, capitalizing on Afghanistan’s location, energy and mineral resources in a mutually interdependent regional framework, could pave the way out of the stability-instability paradox. Not all is lost in Afghanistan.

As Afghanistan traverses a difficult course of transition, there is an immediate need to bridge the perception gap between the Afghans and the international community to build on the gains and address the immediate areas of concern. In the decadelong international involvement, an unified vision and effort of putting Afghans in the lead for rebuilding their state and society remains the missing link in the stabilization efforts. It is critical to rectify this trajectory and set realistic timetables on drawdown based on conditions on the ground. The gains made thus far are substantial but remain fragile.

Unless critical efforts are made to shore up the state’s institutions and capacities before the drawdown date of 2014 and unless longterm international commitment, a unified strategic communications strategy and regional cooperation is guaranteed, stability in Afghanistan would remain a distant dream.